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Abstract
Background: Addressing the social and other non-biological determinants of health largely depends on policies
and programmes implemented outside the health sector. While there is growing evidence on the effectiveness of
interventions that tackle these upstream determinants, the health sector does not typically prioritise them. From a
health perspective, they may not be cost-effective because their non-health outcomes tend to be ignored. Non-
health sectors may, in turn, undervalue interventions with important co-benefits for population health, given their
focus on their own sectoral objectives. The societal value of win-win interventions with impacts on multiple
development goals may, therefore, be under-valued and under-resourced, as a result of siloed resource allocation
mechanisms. Pooling budgets across sectors could ensure the total multi-sectoral value of these interventions is
captured, and sectors’ shared goals are achieved more efficiently. Under such a co-financing approach, the cost of
interventions with multi-sectoral outcomes would be shared by benefiting sectors, stimulating mutually beneficial
cross-sectoral investments. Leveraging funding in other sectors could off-set flat-lining global development
assistance for health and optimise public spending. Although there have been experiments with such cross-sectoral
co-financing in several settings, there has been limited analysis to examine these models, their performance and
their institutional feasibility.
Aim: This study aimed to identify and characterise cross-sectoral co-financing models, their operational modalities,
effectiveness, and institutional enablers and barriers.
Methods: We conducted a systematic review of peer-reviewed and grey literature, following PRISMA guidelines.
Studies were included if data was provided on interventions funded across two or more sectors, or multiple
budgets. Extracted data were categorised and qualitatively coded.
Results: Of 2751 publications screened, 81 cases of co-financing were identified. Most were from high-income
countries (93%), but six innovative models were found in Uganda, Brazil, El Salvador, Mozambique, Zambia, and
Kenya that also included non-public and international payers. The highest number of cases involved the health
(93%), social care (64%) and education (22%) sectors. Co-financing models were most often implemented with the
intention of integrating services across sectors for defined target populations, although models were also found
aimed at health promotion activities outside the health sector and cross-sectoral financial rewards. Interventions
were either implemented and governed by a single sector or delivered in an integrated manner with cross-sectoral
accountability. Resource constraints and political relevance emerged as key enablers of co-financing, while lack of
clarity around the roles of different sectoral players and the objectives of the pooling were found to be barriers to
success. Although rigorous impact or economic evaluations were scarce, positive process measures were frequently
reported with some evidence suggesting co-financing contributed to improved outcomes.
(Continued on next page)
© The Author(s). 2019 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
* Correspondence: vijayasingham@unu.edu
2United Nations University-International Institute for Global Health, Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
McGuire et al. Globalization and Health           (2019) 15:86 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-019-0513-7
(Continued from previous page)
Conclusion: Co-financing remains in an exploratory phase, with diverse models having been implemented across
sectors and settings. By incentivising intersectoral action on structural inequities and barriers to health interventions,
such a novel financing mechanism could contribute to more effective engagement of non-health sectors; to
efficiency gains in the financing of universal health coverage; and to simultaneously achieving health and other
well-being related sustainable development goals.
Keywords: Health financing, Intersectoral, Co-financing, Pooled budgets, Social determinants of health
Introduction
Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) will require substantial investment globally. The
estimated price tag for the ‘health for all’ goal alone is
USD 3.9 trillion for 75% of the world population [1, 2]
while delivering on all the SDGs will need an annual in-
vestment of USD 3.9 trillion, with a current gap of USD
2.5 trillion [3, 4]. Amidst dynamics of escalating costs,
growing populations and diminishing international de-
velopment financing, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda
on Financing for Development calls for accelerated and
aligned mobilization of public, private, domestic and
international financing; innovative financing mecha-
nisms; and systemic change to harness the synergistic ef-
ficiency gains from investing across sectors and goals
[5]. Indeed, the SDGs will not be achieved based on
current financing trends and systems of planning, bud-
geting and service delivery that operate in sectoral siloes
that do not value or prioritise development synergies [6,
7].
Despite strong calls for ‘whole-of-government’ ap-
proaches, ‘health-in-all-policies’, and ‘intersectoral action
for health’, financing for health impact is still dominated
by a sectoral approach reflecting a biomedical focus on
proximal determinants of health [8]. Single sector finan-
cing is particularly problematic for the funding of struc-
tural interventions that address the social determinants
of health, which have the potential to generate large
health gains and synergies across the SDGs [9, 10]. For
example, 50% of the global mortality reduction in
children under-5 between 1990 and 2010 has been at-
tributed to non-health sector investments, such as in-
frastructure development and expanding access to
education [11]. Similarly, programmes and policies that
increase gender equality (including gender-based vio-
lence prevention, economic empowerment for women,
interventions to keep adolescent girls in school and
transform unequal gender norms) have also been found
to reduce disease risk, increase health service uptake and
significantly improve health outcomes [12, 13].
However, health sectors rarely invest substantially in
these intersectoral interventions, partly as a result of the
prevailing narrow approaches to evaluating investment
value, which often excludes the consideration of non-
health costs and impacts [14]. Similar paradigms in
other sectors may also undervalue health co-benefits
from non-health sector investments. In recent years,
there has been increasing recognition that intersectoral
investment analyses should be adopted where relevant
for investment in health [15, 16]; and that governments
need to provide the incentives, budgetary commitments,
and sustainable mechanisms to support multisectoral
collaboration [8, 17]. Countries across income levels are
beginning to explore how best to institutionalise these,
and the funding flows that result from them [6].
Inter-sectoral co-financing could be one of the funding
instruments to enable intersectoral action and overcome
the fragmentation and inefficiencies of silo budgeting
[9]. Co-financing is defined as the joint financing of a
programme or intervention by two or more budget
holders that have different sectoral objectives to jointly
achieve their separate goals more efficiently. In theory,
this could mean increasing the resource envelope for
health spending by pooling funds with non-health sec-
tors and thus leveraging additional investment in health,
as well as more efficient purchasing of health-producing
interventions beyond the health system [18].
Co-financing has been implemented in a number of
high-income countries, but there is limited evidence of
its impact on costs, funding flows or health outcomes.
McDaid & Park (2016) reviewed case studies of fi-
nancing and budgeting mechanisms for intersectoral
collaboration for health promotion between the health,
education, social welfare, and labour sectors. The
authors identified three principal financing mechanisms:
discretionary earmarked funding, recurring delegated fi-
nancing allocated to independent bodies, and joint bud-
geting [19]. The latter reflects a co-financing approach,
as it involves joint budgeting between two or more sec-
tors. Mason and colleagues (2015) reviewed evidence on
integrated financing models, which they referred to as
integrated resource mechanisms, between the health and
social care sectors in eight high-income countries [20].
Both studies found examples of successful co-financing
that uncovered unmet need and improved short-term
health outcomes, but overall, they concluded that there
is limited evidence to conclusively demonstrate that co-
financing has maximised programme and policy impact
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or lowered costs to sectoral payers. Similarly, the body
of literature on the health sector’s involvement in inter-
sectoral action only minimally addresses its financing
implications [6, 21], including how budgeting and ac-
counting arrangements are negotiated and implemented.
More evidence is, therefore required to better under-
stand which financing models can improve the uptake
and sustainability of intersectoral collaboration across a
more diverse range of settings.
To extend the reviews above, given the global remit of
the SDGs and the range of sectors that can influence
population health, we aim to review and synthesise evi-
dence on co-financing arrangements beyond the health
and social care sectors, and beyond high-income coun-
tries. In this article, we identify and characterise such
cross-sectoral co-financing models, their operational
modalities, effectiveness, and institutional enablers and
barriers. We first present the typologies of co-financing
models classified by benefits and financing mechanisms.
We then present qualitative themes of barriers and en-
ablers of uptake, implementation, and continuation of
the co-financing approach, and discuss lessons learned
and future implementation and research needs.
Methods
Definitions
Intersectoral co-financing (hereafter referred to as ‘co-fi-
nancing’) cases were conceptualised according to two
criteria. First, co-financing requires the joint commit-
ment of resources towards an intervention or interven-
tions by at least two budget holders. Resources can
include financial or in-kind contributions. Second, the
budget holders must have dissimilar programming
objectives, or more specifically, they must be allocating
their resources to achieve distinct end outcomes. These
outcomes can be defined at a sectoral or sub-sectoral
level (e.g. population health outcomes, such as lives
saved or quality of life gained; or disease-specific out-
comes, such as HIV infections averted). Two health sec-
tor budget holders combining their resources to achieve
the same outcome (such as a Ministry of Health and an
external donor) would not classify as co-financing given
the shared objective.
The approach draws conceptually on health system
financing, with its three distinct functions: revenue col-
lection (to raise money for health); pooling of resources
(to share the financial risks of paying for healthcare);
and purchasing of services and interventions (to opti-
mise the use of health resources) [22]. Although health
financing focuses primarily on how to pay for healthcare
services and public health interventions, co-financing
focuses more on how to raise money for health out-
comes across public sector payers, and then how to use
those funds to purchase healthcare and non-health
interventions that maximise health outcomes [23].
Clearly, what is considered ‘revenue collection’ for one
sector (health, in this case) is a form of purchasing out-
comes for the contributing sector. Moreover, the pro-
grammatic financial risk is shared across sectors, as no
single-payer takes on the full cost of delivering the inter-
vention/service, but this is quite distinct from the risk-
pooling of individual health risk.
Co-financing can, therefore, involve sharing the rev-
enue collection and/or purchasing functions across
payers from different sectors. For the health sector, this
would allow for non-health sector resources to be
leveraged for health gain, and for strategic purchasing
of non-health interventions with co-benefits. The types
of financial mechanisms used to operationalise co-
financing can be further sub-categorised, based on the
typology summarised in Table 1 that is adapted from
Mason et al. (2015) [20].
Search strategy, article screening and inclusion
The review process was guided by the Preferred Reporting
Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses (PRISMA)
statement. A systematic search of peer-reviewed and grey
literature was performed using a three-level process. First,
sixteen electronic bibliographic academic databases were
searched: Africa-wide Information, Applied Social Sciences
Index & Abstracts, CINAHL Plus, EconLit, EMBASE,
ERIC, Global Health, Health System Evidence, HMIC, IBSS,
MEDLINE, PsycINFO, ScienceDirect, SCOPUS, Social Pol-
icy & Practise and Web of Science. Second, grey and policy
literature was identified through a structured search of
Google, Open Grey, the OECD iLibrary, the World Bank
eLibrary, and ADOLEC Lit. Finally, reference snowballing
or hand searches of included articles was used to identify
any previously unidentified articles. No geographical or
publication date constraints were applied. The search was
limited to articles published in English before March 2018
(see additional file 2 for search strategy).
After removal of duplicates, each record (title and
abstracts) was independently screened and categorised
by two authors (FM and MR), and disagreements were
resolved through discussions. Table 2 lists the inclusion
and exclusion criteria for studies. Both qualitative and
quantitative study methodologies and data were included
– qualitative for establishing typologies and themes on
the enablers and barriers, and quantitative to assess the
effectiveness of co-financing models. Exclusion for poor
methodological quality was not performed to provide a
critique of current methods to inform future research
design.
Data from included articles were extracted using a
customised tool (in Microsoft Excel) with domains
including the description of the programme or inter-
vention, country, and actors, administrative level of
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operation, payers, purpose of model, financial mecha-
nisms, governance structures, study design, reported out-
comes/effects, barriers and enablers of the co-financing
cases. Where there were multiple publications on a spe-
cific co-financing case, these were included and used to
extract the required information. Extracted data was used
to develop a typology of co-financing models, drawing on
the conceptual definition and financing mechanisms pre-
sented above.
Qualitative data on the enablers and barriers to up-
take, implementation, and continuation of the co-
financing approach was extracted when reported in a
study. This was first coded using open unfocused cod-
ing, based on emergent in-vivo themes (non-a priori).
Next, these open codes were grouped into higher-level
categories and sub-themes, that were constructed based
on an understanding of the text and context.
Results
Search results
The initial search identified 2751 publications (after du-
plicates removed). After screening, 198 publications
were identified as eligible for inclusion (see Fig.1) and
covered 81 separate implemented cases of co-financing.
Most excluded cases involved integration or coordin-
ation without co-financing or co-financing between
budget holders with identical objectives.
The included cases and articles reflected co-financing
arrangements between the health, education, environ-
ment, agriculture, social care, housing, economic and
labour sectors, with different end-objectives, or set of
outcomes. Table 3 outlines the cases identified. More
descriptions of included cases are provided as Additional
file 1.
More than half of the cases involved co-financing be-
tween the health and social care sectors (including social
services and with other sectors), with the education sec-
tor as the next most frequent co-financing partner of the
health sector. Only five cases did not involve the health
sector (from the United States, England and New Zea-
land), but involved the education with social care or vo-
cational rehabilitation sectors (n = 2), and the justice
with vocational rehabilitation, housing and social care
sectors.
Typology of co-financing models and their financing
mechanisms
The first characteristic that differentiated the co-
financing cases identified was the objectives that they
Table 2 Inclusion & exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria
• Studies describing a co-financing case (with or without an evaluation);
• Co-financing between any two sectors or sub-sectors (i.e. no sectoral
restrictions);
• English language
Exclusion criteria
• Guidelines for how to implement co-financing;
• Articles with insufficient information to adequately identify a
co-financing case;
• Commentaries or policy briefs mentioning co-financing (In these
instances, primary studies were sourced);
• Purely commercial relationships such as those between public sector
actors and private sector contractors (e.g. Private Finance Initiatives or
Public-Private Partnerships are not co-financing because the private
entity’s profit objective is not a final outcome, it is an intermediate
objective that the contractual arrangement aims to align to the
ultimate public objective or outcome measure).
Table 1 Types of financial mechanisms for co-financing
Financial mechanism Definition
Revenue collection
1. Pooled funds At least two budget holders make contributions to a single pool for spending on pre-agreed services or interventions.
This can be done at various levels (national, regional, local) and accessed in different ways (i.e. grants or regular
budgetary system).
2. Aligned budgets Budget holders align resources, identify own contributions towards pre-specified common objectives. Joint monitoring
of spending and performance, but management remains separate.
3. Structural integration Full integration of cross-sector responsibilities, finances and resources under single management or a single
organisation.
Purchasing
1. Joint or lead
commissioning
Separate budget holders jointly identify a need and agree on a set of objectives, then commission services and track
outcomes. The commissioning itself can be done through a joint authority board or through one agency taking
commissioning responsibility.
2. Cross-charging The mechanism whereby a cross-sector financial penalty is incurred for the non-achievement of a pre-specified target.
Cross-charging compensates sectors who incur an external cost from another sector’s poor performance.
3. Transfer payments Sectoral budget holders make service revenue or capital contributions to bodies in other sectors to support additional
services or interventions in this other sector.
Adapted from Mason et al. (2015) [20]
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were trying to achieve. All co-financing cases found were
broadly similar in their ultimate objective, that is to im-
prove each participating sector’s outcomes and/or re-
duce their costs. However, we observed two distinct
approaches for how the models would allow them to do
so, which we define as ‘integrative’ co-financing and
‘promotion’ co-financing cases. Integrative models en-
gaged in co-financing to integrate or better coordinate
service provision across sectors, often for a specific
population group. They tended to involve sectors with
regular simultaneous or consecutive service provision.
Most commonly, this involved financing the coordinated
provision of health and social care services for a pre-
defined population. For instance, integrated health and
social care commissioning were introduced in Scotland
in 2014 in response to the recognition of the importance
of the social care sector in stemming rising expenditure
in the health care sector [24–28]. Financial pressure on
the health care system was predicted to worsen with the
elderly population projected to increase by 85% between
2014 and 2039 while 34% of the household include at
least one individual suffering from a chronic health
problem or disability. The aim of the integration is to
provide high-quality care and joined-up services that
support people to stay in their homes. Similarly, the Sys-
tem for Integrated Care for Older Persons (SIPA) case
implemented in Canada was aimed at community-based
elderly individuals who are at-risk of requiring institutio-
nalisation and frequent access to acute health care ser-
vices [29–31]. The objective of the programme was to
meet the health and social care needs of individuals in
an integrated manner, through multidisciplinary team
service provision.
Promotion models involved one sector investing in
another sector, and leveraging its resources, to ad-
dress upstream factors that affect its own sectoral
outcomes. These were often models for health pro-
motion. For example, the Prince Edward Island
Fig. 1 Article Screening and Inclusion based on PRISMA
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province in Canada, recognising the breadth of the
factors that influence health, designed an explicit fi-
nancial and governance mechanism to facilitate cross-
sectoral action [32–34]. This mechanism included
several sectors, i.e. health, education, housing, social
security, employment, justice and city planning). Two
promotion cases in Kenya and Zambia focused on the
school-based provision of health services, specifically
deworming, which involved the health and education
sectors [35–41]. The education sector contributed re-
sources to the intervention because of the recognition
of the promotional effect of good health on education
outcomes.
Unlike integrative models, promotion co-financing cases
tended to involve sectors with less service overlap. Broadly
speaking, integrative co-financing was population-centric,
while promotion co-financing was more intervention-
centric. The tables presenting the co-financing cases iden-
tified are disaggregated by co-financing typology and
included as supplementary material.
The financial mechanisms that were used to oper-
ationalise these co-financing cases are summarised in
[Table 4. Most of the integrative cases involved sub-
national pooling of budgets, whereas most promotion
cases were transfer payments or grants from a health
payer, based on intersectoral project proposals. It
should be noted that while the co-financing cases have
been broadly categorised based on their primary func-
tion, several cases combined both revenue collection
and purchasing functions. For example, the North-
Table 3 Description of Cases
Total Included Cases Total Promotion Casesa Integrative Casesb
81 24 57
Country Development Status High-Income Country 75 15 57
Low-and-Middle-Income Country 6 9 0
Geographical Region Europe 39 6 33
North America 25 9 16
South America 2 2 0
Africa 4 4 0
Asia 1 1 0
Oceania 10 2 8
Co-financing Involvement of Sectors Health 76 21 55
Education 18 12 6
Social Care 52 1 51
Housing 5 3 2
Justice 7 6 1
Social services 5 4 1
Agriculture 5 2 3
Other 31 12 19
Co-financing partnership across sectors Health + Social Care (only) 46 0 46
Health+ Social Care +Other sectors 6 1 5
Health + Education (only) 5 2 3
Health + Education +Other Sectors (excluding social care) 10 9 1
Health +Other Sectors (excluding social care and education) 3 3 0
Health sector alone (as coordinators of intersectoral financing) 6 6 0
Non-health sector 5 3 2
Administrative level of government National 29 9 20
State/ Regional/Local 52 15 37
Implementation Period Pre-2000 27 3 24
Post-2000 54 21 33
aPromotion Cases: single-sector investment in another sector to leverage resources and address upstream factors that affect its own sectoral outcomes
bIntegrative Cases: integrated or coordinated service provision across sectors, often for a specific population group
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Table 4 Description of financial mechanisms used to implement the co-financing approach
Financial
Mechanism
Description Review findings: number of cases and examples
Integrative cases Promotion cases
Revenue collection
1. a) National
pooled budget
Pooled budgets were established at
national level, with decentralised bodies
developing plans for use of the funds
related to local objectives and priorities.
The aims of the individual decentralised
cases were diverse and locally variable.
Some consisted of braiding financing
streams, whereby funds were not fully
integrated, and it was possible to trace
the source of each expenditure, while
other included blended financing
streams, whereby the money in the
pool lost its sectoral source identity.
6 cases
• Reshaping Care for Older People
(Scotland) [24–28]
• Children’s Trust Pathfinders
(England) [42]
• Better Care Fund (England) [43–48]
No case identified
1. b) Sub-
national pooled
budgets
This mechanism was often enabled
through national legislation permitting
voluntary budget pooling by local
government across sectors and the
joint commissioning of multi-sectoral
services.
Budget holders’ contributions were
identified from the outset and
expenditures were planned from
inception in some cases, and not in
others to allow flexibility in how the
funds were used.
26 cases
• Health Flexibilities Act Section 75 for
Clinical commissioning groups and
local authorities (England) [47, 49]
• SOCSAM (Sweden)-legislation that
enabled social insurance, social
services and health care services to
be jointly co-financed between
government and municipals [50–52]
• Australian Capital Territory (ACT)
Coordinated Care trial (Australia)
[30, 53–55]
• System of Integrated Care for Older
Persons (Canada) [29–31, 56]
5 cases
• Justice Sector Fund (New Zealand)
[57–59]
• Prince Edward Island (Canada) [32–34]
• Ceará Multi-Sector Social Inclusion
Development Program (Brazil) [60–67]
2. a) Aligned
budgets
Aligned budget tended to be adopted
where partnerships were yet to mature
or where there was a concern that
partners would be over-cautious or
under-fund pooled budgets.
whereby numerous ministries contributed
to activities within the programme but
the management and accountability for
the resourcing remained entirely separate.
There were often no statutory hindrances
or restrictions.
2 cases
• Financial Coordination of
Rehabilitation Measures Act (FINSAM)
(Sweden) [68–70]
• Community Health Partnerships
(Scotland) [71, 72]
3 cases
• Programme for the Modernisation of
Agriculture (Uganda) [73–76]
• Interagency Programme for the
Empowerment of Adolescent Girls
(El Salvador) [77]
• Pathfinder’s Geração Biz (“busy
generation”) Programme for sexual and
reproductive health and HIV
(Mozambique) [78–81]
2. b) In-kind
support
Sectors contributed non-financial re
sources (e.g. human resources, infrastruc
ture, and technology) towards the joint
provision of an intervention or programme
with a shared objective.
This mechanism was often used in
circumstances where sectors were
constrained by very limited financial
resources, limited financial autonomy or
in-kind support was more beneficial to
service delivery than additional financial
resources
No case identified 2 cases
• School Health and Nutrition (Zambia)
[35–37]
• National School-Based Deworming
Programme (Kenya) [38–41]
3. Structural
integration
Full organisational and budgetary
integration of cross sector responsibilities
into a single organisation.
8 cases
• Care Trusts at local area level with
full responsibility for the pooled
budget and purchasing for health
and social care (England)
[47, 73, 82–87]
• Health and Social Care Boards
commissioning services (Northern
Ireland) [24, 88, 89]
No case identified
Purchasing
4. Joint/lead
commissioning
Joint commissioning was undertaken
with and without pooled budgets.
6 cases
• Contra Costa County Community
No case identified
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West London Integrated Care Pilot utilised lead
commissioning, in tandem with the additional align-
ment of financial incentives whereby participating orga-
nisations agreed to share any savings that materialised
from the pilot for joint re-investment [82, 94, 95].
Table 3 also categorises case descriptions according
to the financing typologies. In promotion cases, co-
financing between health, education and other sectors
(excluding social care) were most common, and ar-
rangements where the health sector as lone coordina-
tors (n = 6; mostly providers of intersectoral grants)
was only apparent in promotion cases. All cases from
Africa, Asia, and South America were promotion-
based, occurred after the year 2000, and the six cases
from Africa and South America all involved the
health and education sector (mostly targeting children
and adolescent populations) with two of these cases
also including the agriculture sector. The single Asian
case (from South Korea) only included the health sec-
tor as a coordinating body of earmarked sin tax that
was distributed to intersectoral partners [115, 116].
Co-financing in Africa and South America also in-
volved financing from international donor and devel-
opment agencies, such as the World Bank, UNDP,
the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
and the Gates Foundation.
In addition, the cases could be further distinguished
according to whether the financing first flowed through
sectors or not. Ex ante co-financing were cases where
funds were pooled prior to allocation across different
sectors (e.g. national pooled budgets with grant applica-
tions, or sectoral grant mechanisms requiring intersec-
toral proposals) while ex post co-financing occurred
when sectors that had already been allocated sectoral
funds from a central authority subsequently dedicated
those funds to co-financing arrangements. Although cer-
tain mechanisms, such as cross-charging, only fall under
the post-allocation characterisation; others like pooled
budgets were created before or after funds were allo-
cated at the sectoral level. It was not always possible to
identify the origin of the funds dedicated in co-financing
cases.
Evidence on impact from co-financing cases
Evaluation of study designs
Table 5 outlines the types of methodologies and study
designs used in the included articles. These studies fo-
cussed evaluating the interventions and programme areas
that were co-financed, rather than on the co-financing
mechanism itself. Most cases had more than one evalu-
ation and used more than one methodology. Case study
design and qualitative methodologies were most
Table 4 Description of financial mechanisms used to implement the co-financing approach (Continued)
Financial
Mechanism
Description Review findings: number of cases and examples
Integrative cases Promotion cases
The commissioning of services with pooled
budgets could be undertaken through lead
commissioning whereby one agency was
delegated authority for purchasing services
across the jurisdiction of all sectors
contributing to the pool.
Otherwise, a joint authority was established
with representatives of all pool contributors,
managing the pool on behalf of partners,
through agreed delegation arrangements.
Services Department coordinated
funds for early education (USA)
[90–93]
• North West London Integrated Care
Pilot (England) [82, 94–99]
• The Home Loans Equipment Centre
(HLEC) (England) [80, 94, 100]
5. Cross-
charging
Cross-charging was implemented as a form
of Pigouvian taxation, where a sector’s
performance incurred an externality on
another sector.
It often involved little to no integration of
functions, organisations or services.
3 cases
• National Health Service (NHS) mandatory
daily penalties between local authorities
and health care providers for delayed
hospital discharges due to delays in social
services (England) [101–105]
• Denmark cross-charging (Denmark) [106]
• ADEL reform (National Reform of Elderly
Care) (Sweden) [105]
No case identified
6. Transfer
payments
These mainly involved a grant-making
mechanism set up by one payer that
required intersectoral proposals. They
were different from pooled budgets
requiring grant applications in that the
financial allocation originated from a
single sector but was exclusively
accessible for intersectoral action. Such
grants were often disbursed by health
promotion foundations.
No case identified 8 cases identified
• Road Safety Partnership Grant (England)
[65–67]
• New York City Childhood Asthma
Initiative (USA) [107, 108];
• National Development Programme for
Social Welfare and Health Care Theme
(Finland) [109–114]
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dominant, which included stakeholder interviews, focus
groups, and document review. Many cases identified
broad and subjective outcomes which were neither suffi-
ciently specific nor measurable for the use of quantita-
tive approaches. The second most common evaluation
design was uncontrolled trend analysis, frequently using
routinely collected administrative data. Trend analysis
was often undertaken alongside a qualitative evaluation,
with less focus on the quantifiable impact of the co-
financing mechanism. Few studies (15) utilised more
rigorous evaluation methodologies, such as quasi-
experimental evaluations utilising natural experiments,
namely difference-in-difference, and matching met-
hodologies. A smaller number of cases (7) set out to
purposefully establish the causal effects through rando-
mised controlled trials. No associated evaluations were
identified for 26 co-financing cases, often citing a lack
of financial resources and the scale of the evaluation
challenge given the complexity of evaluating multifa-
ceted system-level policies. It is important to note that
implemented cases of co-financing were nearly always
multifaceted system-level interventions, characterised
by a number of governance, financial and regulatory
components. None of the evaluations attempted to iso-
late the impact of the component parts of the co-
financing cases, such as financial integration compared
to the governance integration.
Reported Health outcomes
Health outcomes assessed in the identified cases with
the health sector included mortality, morbidity, health-
related quality of life, service utilisation (inpatient/out-
patient admissions, delayed discharge, nursing home ad-
mission, etc.), and satisfaction measures (provider and
service user) Table 6 outlines the types of outcomes re-
ported within the included cases.
Of the 57 integrative co-financing cases, only 20
attempted to evaluate the effect on health outcomes.
Most of these used quasi-experimental or experimental
methodologies (14/20). Ten of these evaluations re-
ported no effect of the co-financing on health outcomes;
three cases reported a positive effect; one case each re-
ported mixed and negative effects. Predictably, many of
the evaluations that assessed the effect on health out-
comes also examined the effect on service utilisation
(13/20). Less than half of the cases that reported on
health service utilisation found a positive effect in terms
of reduced health care utilisation and cost.
Fewer promotion co-financing models examined the
effects on health outcomes (7/24) and service utilisation
(4/24). The evaluation of a majority of promotion cases
was undertaken through qualitative or (uncontrolled)
trend analysis. A minority of promotion cases (3/24)
undertook a (quasi-) experimental evaluation. This may
be partly explained by fewer cases involving the health or
social care sectors. All of these cases reported some degree
of a positive effect from the co-financing approach.
Reported non-health outcomes
Only 12 of 81 cases reported performance on non-health
outcomes. Other sectoral outcomes reported for integra-
tive co-financing cases included educational attainment
and school completion rates, housing, employment and
wage rates. Promotion co-financing cases reported only
positive effects for the following non-health outcomes:
cognitive test scores, average grades, access to special
education and reduced illiteracy; reduced contact time
with the police and police call-outs; access to supportive
permanent housing; households with water connections;
improved children’s diets; increased farmers’ income and
livestock production. Two of the six cases from LMICs
(Uganda and Brazil) included evaluations of health, edu-
cation, economic development, agricultural, water and
sanitation outcomes. In Uganda, evaluations of the
Programme for the Modernisation of Agriculture indi-
cated that there were economic returns from advisory
services, where farmers perceived that their livestock in-
creased, their yields were either constant or increased
and overall felt that community wealth was improving
[73–76]. In Brazil, the Ceará Multi-Sector Social Inclu-
sion Development Programme contributed to a signifi-
cant reduction in illiteracy within the population over
the age of 15 years [60–67].
Table 7 illustrates that a significant number of
payers participated in co-financing without any
Table 5 Evaluation methodologies of co-financing cases
Evaluation methodology No. of cases
Qualitative (including interviews, focus groups, document review, questionnaires, workshops, etc.) 37
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) 7
Quasi-experimental 15
(Uncontrolled) trend analysis 24
No evaluation identified 26
*If an evaluation used more than one methodology, as outlined in the table, these were recorded as separate evaluations e.g. the evaluation of Children’s Trust
Pathfinders utilised both trend analysis and qualitative evaluations, therefore, both were captured in the above table
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collection of relevant indicators to attempt to attri-
bute evidence of sectoral benefit. There are also a
number of cases in which an evaluation took place,
but relevant outcome data for at least one participat-
ing payer were not collected.
Barriers and enablers to uptake, implementation and
continuation of co-financing
The core themes identified across both barriers and
enablers included: (1) conceptual buy-in; (2) model
planning, design, implementation and framing; (3)
organizational capacity, resources and time horizons; (4)
relational factors and organizational culture; (5) finance
and accounting practices; and (6) evidence, monitoring
and accountability. Table 8 outlines the synthesised cat-
egories and themes of reported barriers and enablers,
along with examples of open codes that were grouped
into the thematic categories.
A critical theme for the implementation of co-
financing models was the accounting, financial prac-
tices and organizational capacity to implement change.
Co-financing often required the reprogramming of
financial resources by at least one budget holder, which
was difficult given its impact on vested interests and
the legacy of competition within the public sector
[117]. Furthermore, in the face of constrained budgets,
several studies reported an understandable desire for
public actors to behave conservatively, reverting to
traditional core functions, and safeguarding resources.
A lack of financial resources and high resource require-
ments of activities perceived as the core, such as acute
health care, was commonly cited as a barrier for any or
further engagement with co-financing. Additionally,
rigid budgets and the lack of budgetary autonomy were
stated as barriers to co-financing uptake and implemen-
tation [118]. Government ministries and departments
often had mandates to provide certain services or re-
ceived budgets ring-fenced for certain activities. The
degree of autonomy over financial resources differed
across levels of governance and level of fiscal decentral-
isation, with more flexibility reported at the decentra-
lised level. Interestingly, limited financial resources
were perceived as both a barrier to the implementation
of co-financing and an enabler to getting cross-sectoral
buy-in. Depending on the context, limited resources
was discussed as a reason to pool resources with other
Table 6 Health Outcomes measures by model type
Outcome Integrative co-financing Promotion co-financing
Health outcome (health-related quality of life, mortality) 20 of 57 cases
• 14 evaluations reported
no effect
• 3 reported a positive effect
• 1 reported a mixed effect
• 2 reported a negative effect
7 of 24 cases
• 7 evaluations reported
positive effects
Health service utilisation (delayed discharge, hospital admissions, readmissions, nursing
home admission etc.)
19 of 57 cases
• 4 report no effect
• 9 report reduction in health
care utilisation/cost
• 5 report mixed effects
• 1 report increase in health care
utilisation/cost
4 of 24 cases
• 4 cases reported positive
effects
Non-health outcomes (school completion, grade average, criminal offending rates,
individuals housed, average wage, employment rate, etc.)
4 of 57 cases
• 3 cases reported positive
effects
• 1 case reported no effect
8 of 24 cases
8 cases reported positive
effects
Table 7 Assessment of relevant cross-sectoral outcomes
Sector payer Data on relevant outcomes
Collected Not collected
Health 31 23
Social Care 11 28
Education 4 13
Justice 2 7
Housing 2 2
Other (agriculture, vocational rehabilitation, environment, transport etc.) 2 7
*Sector outcomes of interest are, to a degree, subjective, and at times not easily assigned to any single sector, an attempt at classification has been made to
classify under sectors deemed most relevant
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Table 8 Themes and Open Codes of Barriers and Enablers to Uptake, Implementation and Continuation of Co-financing Models
Example of Open Codes for Barriers Sub Categories of
Barriers
Theme Sub-Categories of
Enablers
Example of Open Codes for Enablers
• perceived risk,
• ambiguities,
• unclear timeframes to realise
positive impact,
• concerns over likely power shifts,
• concerns over expansion of duties
without matched increase in
capacity,
• perceived sense of position threat,
• streamlining of functions leading
to job loss,
• lack of buy-in from actors across
levels,
• fear of impact on branding and
position,
• unsupportive public/client groups
• Perceived underperformance of
programme
Actor resistance due
to perceived risk,
ambiguities and
threats
Conceptual Buy-In Favourable political
climate, client, actor
and public support
• Recognition of need for change
• effective incentives and perceived value,
• limited resource as opportunity
• upstream-downstream discord-
non-aligned prioritisation between
administrative levels of
government,
• lack of consensus in negotiated
details,
• ambiguous terms,
• inequitable funding arrangements,
• lack of pre-defined responsibilities,
• dissimilar shared purpose
(operational, programmatic and of
partnership),
• (lack of) unity between leads,
• ineffective change management,
• unclear lines of authority
Unclear terms and
unmatched
partnership
Model Design,
Planning Framing
and
Implementation
Effective planning • Specific and outcome focussed framing in
design and implementation,
• extensive stakeholder consultation,
• space for flexibility,
• sustainability planning,
• external facilitation and mediation
Context level for
implementation
• Actors were positioned to facilitate
intersectoral coordination
• limited resources as obstacle,
• differential IT infrastructure-
hardware/Software,
• lack of shared information sources,
• turnover of key positions
(operational)
• hardware and software
Inadequate or
incongruent
resources
Organizational
Resources and
Capacity
Matched Partnership • Matched partner resources - equal size,
capacity, financial equity,
• decision-making and implementation
• differences in pay scale,
• different operational processes
Differences in human
resources and ways
of working
Adequate Expertise
and Capacity
• Expertise of implementing team,
• multidisciplinary capacity,
• capacity to offset risk and uncertainties,
• ability to be responsive to needs,
• stability of key positions
• lack of leadership readiness,
• no leadership buy in
Leadership Leadership • Strong leadership,
• Prioritisation from leaders,
• low turnover of leadership position
• timelines not sufficient to produce
impact,
• long-term sustainability to con-
tinue beyond pilot or single term
Time Time • Time to foster relationship and achieve
impact
• no confidence in partners,
• poor relationships,
• different work culture/practices/
processes,
• strained communication,
• unmatched prioritisation of co-
financing between collaborators
Non-constructive
relational and work
dynamics
Relational and
Organizational
Culture
Established positive
relational and work
dynamics
• Extensive engagements,
• effective relationships,
• mutual trust,
• culture of collaborative work,
• history/record of collaborative work and
partnership, progressive understanding of
each other organization, culture, and
practices,
• joint-training and knowledge dissemination
• weak and subjective evidence,
• access to data and confidentiality
Insufficient result-
focussed practices
Evidence, Output
Data Monitoring
Set targets • Creation of interagency performance
targets
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sectors, and in separate cases, were also discussed as a
limiting factor that prevented the implementation of
co-financed programmes [43, 83, 119, 120].
Differential organizational capacity, resources, regula-
tory requirements and operational processes were also
cited as barriers to implementation. The legalities of co-
financing were found to be complex in some cases, given
sectors’ different regulatory and accountability systems.
For example, this was raised in relation to co-financing
of adult health and social care in England, where health
care provision is universal and free while social care is
means-tested and any joint working must take this into
account [43–48]. Relatedly, the theme of relational and
organisational cultures emerged as key factor in the initi-
ation, and implementation of co-financing, which was
enabled by trust and matched partnerships. From the
cases identified, it was clear that certain sectors were
more amenable to co-financing, given historical connec-
tions of working together. Leveraging these historical
relationships could be an enabler to establishing co-
financing arrangements. It could be argued there is an
inverse relationship between past integrated activities
and the strength of the rationale required for adopting
co-financing. Additionally, failures from past pro-
grammes were also observed as catalysts to try new
approaches.
The importance of data, monitoring and accountability
frameworks was highlighted across studies, as a means
to foster initial and ongoing conceptual buy-in amongst
resistant actors and to track benefits from co-financing
for the partners involved. A key theme on barriers to up-
take was uncertainty around the value of co-financing in
practice, due to a lack of evidence, and uncertainty
around the objective and scope of the co-financing ap-
proach, particularly if imposed in a top-down manner.
Conversely, a key enabler for co-financing continuation
was demonstrated success from co-financing pilots
[121], which could lead to the replication or scaling up
of the model. For instance, the adoption of a National
School Health Policy in Zambia originated from a pilot
programme with rigorous evaluation and positive im-
pacts, which encouraged the Ministries of Health and
Education, among others, to formalise the programme
and scale up nationally [35]. Additionally, the creation of
interagency performance targets was shown to be a po-
tential catalyst for the initiation of co-financing arrange-
ments [121]. By holding several agencies collectively
responsible for achieving pre-specified targets, govern-
ments incentivised intersectoral partnerships in New
Zealand [57].
Discussion
In this article, we identify and examine cases of co-
financing between the health and/or other non-health
sectors, with a focus on their objectives, financial mecha-
nisms, reported impact, institutional barriers and enablers.
Findings suggest that co-financing of programmes or in-
terventions by multiple benefiting sectors has been imple-
mented in a range of settings, in various ways and with
varying degrees of success. We identify two dominant
types of co-financing models: integrative models that mo-
bilise resources and fund integrated service provision
across sectors (an extension of Mason and colleagues’
work) [20]; and promotion models that fund programmes
that address upstream factors to promote a downstream
sectoral objective. While integrative models were largely
operationalised through sub-national pooled budgets with
some form of joint or lead commissioning and were most
common in high-income country settings, promotion
models were more diverse and tended to use aligned bud-
gets or grant modalities to fund intersectoral projects.
Table 8 Themes and Open Codes of Barriers and Enablers to Uptake, Implementation and Continuation of Co-financing Models
(Continued)
Example of Open Codes for Barriers Sub Categories of
Barriers
Theme Sub-Categories of
Enablers
Example of Open Codes for Enablers
issues,
• lack of common culture, record
and practice for accountability,
• different data reporting
requirements
and Evaluation Evidence of success • Demonstrated success of pilot initiatives
• different accounting techniques,
• reduced sense of financial
flexibility,
• rigidity in resource allocation,
• rigid line-item accounting,
• unanticipated rise in costs, or non-
budgeted cost domains,
• no matched change in
accounting practice,
• allocations based on historic
trends-not current needs
Unmatched methods
and capacity to
adapt to needs
Finance and
Accounting
Practices
Financial control • shared pre-negotiated control of funds
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As highlighted in previous literature in this area, the
current body of evidence on the practice of co-
financing is still weak by virtue of the success metrics
and evaluation methodologies used, as well as the level
and scale of implementation [19, 20]. The relatively
small number of identified co-financing cases also re-
flects both the general difficulty of undertaking inter-
sectoral programming, and the specific challenges of
engaging inter-sectoral financing mechanisms. In the
cases reviewed, co-financing arrangements included a
complex and customised mixture of governance, moni-
toring and evaluation and planning. Co-financing did
not always lead to the efficiency gains that are theoret-
ically possible, or this was not assessed, suggesting that
further focus on impact, costs and optimising imple-
mentation is required.
Nevertheless, this updated and extended evidence on
co-financing implementation demonstrates that it is in-
stitutionally feasible in a range of settings and sectors,
including in low and middle-income countries, and add-
itional sectors beyond health and social care. The diver-
sity of cases indicates that there is no ‘blueprint’, nor a
single set of contextual characteristics necessary to sup-
port a co-financing approach.
Our thematic synthesis on enabling factors and bar-
riers to uptake, implementation and continuation of co-
financing aligns with existing knowledge on intersectoral
action involving the health sector, including the need for
strong leadership, aligned formal and informal processes,
individual and organizational trust, and credible ac-
countability mechanisms [21, 122, 123]. However, evi-
dence on intersectoral action for health often neglects
the technical aspects of financing arrangements, and the
specific requirements for them to work, such as the need
for balanced financial contributions from partners, and
budgetary autonomy and flexibility. Specific skills are re-
quired in the development stage of such arrangements,
including negotiation, resource mobilisation, effective
communication and public financial management.
Context and policy architecture were important in
each of the cases reviewed. For public sector payers,
the macro-fiscal environment, and specifically how
public financial systems were organized, such as fiscal
centralisation or decentralisation across national/fed-
eral or state/district governments for various sectors
and public functions, influenced how co-financing was
then organized and implemented. Co-financing may
be more difficult in more centralised policy environ-
ments, particularly those without a top-down directive
to co-finance or without enabling policy precedence
and infrastructure.
Compared to pursuing co-financing ‘from scratch’,
there was some indication that co-financing may be
most feasible and impactful where enablers – including
political will at the requisite level, an evaluated and suc-
cessful pilot/programme, a multisectoral plan or per-
formance targets with multi-sectoral accountability, an
intersectoral governance structure, accountability and
monitoring capacities – are already in place and where
efficiency is a more central consideration. Projects with
existing (external) funding, particularly funding which
incentivizes innovation, may increase policymakers’ and
budget holders’ willingness to experiment.
Another observation was that more formal evaluation
structures for projects were implemented at the national
level. Potentially due to larger amount of financial
investments involved, nationally implemented cases of
co-financing tended to document outcomes more com-
prehensively. Nevertheless, nearly two-thirds of cases
were at state, district or local levels of context. One sig-
nificant observation in sub-national, state or local cases,
was that co-financing was largely engaged in voluntarily
through a joint recognition of the benefits of a coopera-
tive approach. In both national and sub-national co-
financing, it was common that only the outcomes and
targets of a single (usually the dominant or driving)
sector was tracked and evaluated. This suggests that
evidence of multi-sectoral gains was not the main justifi-
cation for co-financing; or that there was sufficient trust
that these benefits were being realised.
Study limitations
This endeavour to systematically assess the implementa-
tion of co-financing is not without its limitations. First,
there is a debate about what constitutes a case of co-
financing and the boundaries of the concept. We have
applied our rational conceptualisation of co-financing to
categorise cases, but the reality is that co-financing can be
framed and achieved in multiple ways; this can be politic-
ally advantageous, but it also makes objective classification
difficult. Second, our approach to data extraction and syn-
thesis relied on the clear identification of the objectives of
payers. While theoretically, it is simple to distinguish
organisations with a health objective from those with an
education objective, in reality, this distinction is not always
clear. Relatedly, with growing recognition of the value of
multi-sectoral approaches that address upstream deter-
minants of health (and other social outcomes), organisa-
tions are frequently expanding their operational space.
Third, whereas McDaid and Park classified fiscal incen-
tives (such as tax breaks) as joint budgeting [19], we ex-
cluded these cases, since resources coming directly from
the Ministry of Finance are yet to have a sector-specific
objective assigned to them. Finally, given the international
scope of the cases identified, the English language restric-
tion in the search may have excluded several non-English
reports in the synthesis process. In the snowball retrieval
of literature, a small number of non-English texts were
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identified for included cases from Sweden and Brazil (e.g.
SOCSAM, Ceará Multi-Sector Social Inclusion Develop-
ment Programme), but these were not analysed.
More research is needed to establish a credible evi-
dence base on the impact of co-financing. Evaluation
was frequently constrained by several factors. First, the
systematic review revealed the lack of documented co-
financing cases and a risk of publication bias. Secondly,
of the small number of implemented cases, many did
not engage in any formal evaluation. Thirdly, when there
were evaluations, their study design often lacked the
rigour required to make conclusive statements about the
success or failure of the case and convincingly attribute
observed changes to the implementation of co-financing.
Future implementers of co-financing should consider
more rigorous design and dissemination of impact
evaluations, economic evaluations, and implementation
research.
Considerations for Intersectoral co-financing in the
context of the SDGs
Given the emphasis placed on synergies between goals
and targets in the SDG agenda, co-financing could be
an innovative financing mechanism to help sectors
work together to more efficiently achieve their respect-
ive SDG goals in a coordinated manner. From our ana-
lysis, we find that the health, education and social care
sector are established intersectoral partners for co-
financing, based on extensive historical relationships
and interactions in many high-income countries. Al-
though no attempts were made to prioritise any sectors
in the search strategy, publication bias cannot be ruled
out, where some sectors may be more likely to conduct
and publish evaluations. It is also possible that health
may have been the most prominent sector in the identi-
fied studies, because it is relatively more advanced in
analysing and addressing upstream determinants. The
health and social sectors could qualify as ‘first-movers’
in adopting the principles of co-financing, given the
clear overlaps and targets for coordinated service
delivery.
A number of clear opportunities for SDG synergies
between sectors have been identified in literature [10,
124, 125], including from sectors that do not have a
history of coordination or collaboration. In many cir-
cumstances, interested actors may still need to ‘make a
case’ to engage in new financial relationships across
sectors, but could benefit from framing co-financing as
an opportunity to advance prominent health agendas.
Almost all of the cases from LMIC involved domes-
tic public sector actors, in collaboration with inter-
national donors. Only one case appeared to be fully
driven by public sector ministries (Mozambique).
Many public funders in LMICs are faced with the
task of enhancing domestic spending, optimizing the
fiscal space for health amongst other public goods,
and reducing dependence on out-of-pocket expendi-
tures and overseas development assistance. Leveraging
external financing to catalyse the development of in-
novative context-adapted models can create potential
ways to expand allocations for health or other sec-
toral spending.
The inclusion of co-financing in national and local
planning and financing frameworks for the SDGs, in-
cluding those agreed between national authorities and
development partners, could therefore be an opportunity
[23]. The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) has developed the Mainstreaming Acceleration
and Policy Support (‘MAPS’) approach to SDG imple-
mentation at country-level to support countries to iden-
tify interventions with high-impact across sectors. The
MAPS approach aims to align UN support to member
states in making trade-offs in relation to SDG targets,
and in identifying policies and interventions that have
impact and ‘reach’ across multiple targets. Co-financing
could be a potential fiscal instrument to realise efficiency
gains, should the MAPS-generated political will extend
to reformulating budgetary practices. Also, UNDP’s net-
work of 60 country-based ‘accelerator labs’ (in develop-
ment) aims to identify challenge-solution pairs through
iterative learning and experimentation, for which co-
financing could have potential for ‘SDG accelerator
financing’.
At an international level, multi-lateral organisations
and global donor agencies that have health and cross-
sectoral mandates could also play a role in breaking the
dominant siloed approach to global health financing,
and driving co-financing initiatives, experimentation and
research forward. For instance, The Global Action Plan
for Healthy Lives and Well-being [126], which is a joint
initiative of 12 global health institutions, offers a window
of opportunity to adopt co-financing approaches for
greater efficiency and joint impact. The plan includes
the acceleration of sustainable financing goals, with sub-
aims to increase domestic spending on health and the
use of national fiscal and public financial management
reform, efficient investments, and innovative joint finan-
cing strategies including multi-donor trust funds to
achieve these outcomes.
At national levels, influential political champions (indi-
viduals and sectors) drive the uptake and integration of
co-financing in national policies and strategies [127].
The political dimensions of co-financing appear as, if
not more, important than the technical details. The few
national level pooled funding arrangements identified fo-
cused on issues or population groups (e.g. older persons,
children and better care) with relatively broad political
buy-in and visibility.
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Notable barriers to co-financing uptake and continu-
ation are the lack of supporting evidence, ambiguous
risk profiles and capacity to organize and implement.
The SDGs have placed a heavy emphasis on measurable
targets, and to determine whether co-financing could be
an evidence-based approach to financing the SDGs,
there is need for a body of evidence on its benefits,
trade-offs or limitations. Co-financing does not, by def-
inition, increase aggregate efficiency or lead to cost-
savings. In fact, Mason and colleagues suggest that if
integrated care and funds are successful, they are more
likely to uncover unmet need and lead to increased
costs, as well as improved health. This is also to be ex-
pected in the context of expanding universal health
coverage. Cost-effectiveness and value for money may
therefore be more relevant considerations than cost-
savings. The potential gains that are likely to be achieved
through using a co-financing approach, needs to be
assessed alongside the transaction costs and likelihood
of success of initiatives.
Conclusions
The urgent need to collaborate effectively, ensure coher-
ence and increase resources for health within and
beyond the sector, is well-established. The health-in-all-
policies principle is at the heart of contemporary policy
paradigms and calls to action [128], and in many cases
this may require financing mechanisms and incentives
that enable intersectoral action. There has been little im-
plementation guidance on how to operationalise these
calls, at least at a level of mobilizing intersectoral re-
sources and strategically purchasing intersectoral inter-
ventions. The findings from this review contribute to
this limited body of implementation literature, but there
is need for more evidence and systematic documentation
and learning, particularly from low and middle-income
countries.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has the
potential to be an impetus for more and better resourced
intersectoral action. Achieving the 17 goals and 169 tar-
gets of the inter-linked SDGs, with finite resources, re-
quires greater attention to value for money, stronger
pursuit of innovation and deepened partnerships. New
ways of collaborating and aligning policies and invest-
ments are likely to be tested and negotiated. In this con-
text co-financing may be a tool to overcome barriers such
as perceived risk and ambiguities, rigid budgetary struc-
tures and guidelines, and lack of historical collaboration
between concerned sectors. While available literature and
lessons on co-financing cases is limited, it is growing, and
provides formative operational insights on how current
co-financing models are implemented and where they
have produced impact in practice.
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